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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,1 Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the Court, stated, “When we deal with private actions under 
[section 10(b) and] Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has 
grown from little more than a legislative acorn.”2  The Court in Blue 
Chip described the state of the law: 
No language in [section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] speaks at all to the 
contours of a private cause of action for their violation. . . . We are 
dealing with a private cause of action which has been judicially 
found to exist, and which will have to be judicially delimited one 
way or another unless and until Congress addresses the question.3 
Put simply, because the private right of action under section 10(b)4 
and Rule 10b-55 is judicially implied, courts have wide discretion in 
determining who has standing to sue under these provisions.6 
Standing to sue under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can be de-
terminative of whether an individual or entity has access to a wide 
 
 ∗ Associate, Jones Day, Cleveland, Ohio.  J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 2002; 
B.A., Ohio State University, 1999.  I would like to thank my family for their constant 
support in all of my endeavors.  I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to 
Christine Gall for her critical comments and encouragement while I was drafting this 
Article.  The views set forth in this Article are completely my own and do not neces-
sarily reflect the views of any employer or client either past or present. 
 1 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
 2 Id. at 737. 
 3 Id. at 749. 
 4 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000). 
 5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005). 
 6 Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 749 (discussing the scope of the private right of action 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
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range of relief that these provisions can afford.7  Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 have provided relief in cases of corporate misstatements 
and nondisclosures, insider trading, corporate mismanagement, im-
proper mergers, dishonest corporate reorganizations, and a variety of 
other circumstances involving securities fraud.8 
Although the private right of action under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 has grown far beyond the “legislative acorn,” the “judicial 
oak” is far from fully developed.  This area of law continues to be re-
fined, and the Supreme Court has left open a number of large issues 
regarding standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  For exam-
ple, in Blue Chip, the Supreme Court held that standing to sue for 
monetary damages is limited only to plaintiffs who have purchased or 
sold securities in connection with an alleged manipulative or decep-
tive act.9  The Court, however, did not answer the question whether a 
purchase or sale is required to confer standing to sue for injunctive 
relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and if this standing exists, 
whether a corporate issuer can take advantage of this standing. 
Current case law suggests that a corporate issuer may have stand-
ing to seek injunctive relief without the purchase or sale of a secu-
rity.10  Strong policy justifications support the existence of such an ex-
ception to the purchaser-seller requirement under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.  The Supreme Court, however, has never ruled on 
whether such an exception exists, and substantial obstacles stand in 
the way of the Court allowing such an exception. 
This Article explores whether a corporate issuer has standing to 
seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the 
purchase or sale of a security.  The remainder of this Part contains 
general statements regarding the timeliness of this topic.  Part II pro-
vides background information regarding section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5, the purchaser-seller rule, and the possible exceptions to this rule.  
Part III examines the policy reasons for a corporate issuer having 
standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
without a purchase or sale of a security, and Part IV discusses the ob-
stacles that may impede a court from allowing a corporate issuer such 
standing.  Finally, Part V contains concluding remarks and suggests 
 
 7 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.3[3] (5th ed. 
2005) (discussing the wide variety of contexts in which section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
can provide relief). 
 8 Id. 
 9 421 U.S. at 753–55. 
 10 See infra note 151 (providing case law holding that a corporate issuer may have 
standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the 
purchase or sale of a security). 
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that congressional action would be the best method to ensure issuer 
standing. 
This Article is timely because it analyzes a little-known method 
for corporate issuers to protect themselves against stock manipula-
tion, breaks fresh ground in legal scholarship, and discusses contro-
versial issues that the Supreme Court will ultimately have to decide.  
If a corporate issuer has standing to seek injunctive relief under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, then the issuer has a sword to defend 
against stock manipulation and to protect the value of its securities.  
The purchase or sale of a security is viewed by many as an integral re-
quirement for bringing an action under section 10(b) and Rule  
10b-5.  This Article is significant because it discusses a lesser known 
method for an issuer to defend against stock manipulation in cases in 
which the issuer neither purchased nor sold securities in connection 
with an alleged manipulative or deceptive act or omission. 
This Article is also timely because it fills a unique void in current 
scholarship.  Nearly four decades have passed since a major academic 
work has examined corporate issuer standing to bring an action for 
injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.11  The last major 
examination of this topic occurred in a student comment that was 
published during 1967 in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.12  
In the time since that student comment, the Supreme Court an-
nounced its decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,13 which 
is the seminal case examining standing under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.  Blue Chip definitively established that standing to sue for 
monetary damages under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is available 
only to plaintiffs who have purchased or sold securities in connection 
with an alleged manipulative or deceptive act or omission.14  Blue 
Chip, however, debatably left open whether a purchase or sale is re-
quired to have standing to sue for injunctive relief under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and if this standing exists, whether an issuer 
can take advantage of this standing. 
This Article examines issues that the Supreme Court will have to 
decide.  Whether a corporate issuer has standing to pursue injunctive 
relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must be bifurcated into two 
 
 11 Comment, Private Enforcement Under Rule 10b-5: An Injunction for a Corporate Is-
suer?, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 618 (1967). 
 12 Id. 
 13 421 U.S. 723 (1975); see also Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 
462 (2d Cir. 1952) (providing the rule that became the basis for the Blue Chip deci-
sion). 
 14 Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 753–55. 
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related questions: First, does an individual or entity who does not 
purchase or sell securities in connection with an allegedly manipulat-
ive or deceptive statement have standing to seek injunctive relief un-
der section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5?15  Second, if such standing does ex-
ist, does it extend to an issuer of stock?16  Courts have reached greatly 
varied results in answering both of these questions.17  Unless Congress 
acts first, the Supreme Court will have to resolve the state of the law 
regarding standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  This Article 
analyzes the considerations that the Court must address in adjudicat-
ing these issues. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The first step in analyzing whether a corporate issuer has stand-
ing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with-
out a purchase or sale requires putting the issue in context.  In this 
section, the history of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the purchaser-
seller requirement, and the possible exceptions to this requirement 
will be examined. 
A. The History of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
To understand the history of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, it is 
necessary to review the advent of federal securities laws in the United 
States, the basic structure of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and the 
recognition of a private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.  The dawn of federal securities laws occurred in the 1930s.  In 
the shadow of the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing de-
pression, Congress enacted two major pieces of legislation designed 
to govern the sale of securities.18  These two pieces of legislation, the 
Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”)19 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (“1934 Act”),20 represent the first major federal attempts at 
securities regulation.21 
 
 15 See infra Part II.C (discussing the validity of the injunctive relief exception to 
the purchaser-seller rule). 
 16 See infra Parts III, IV, V (analyzing issuer standing to seek injunctive relief un-
der section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security). 
 17 See infra Parts II.C, III, IV. 
 18 See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 727 (discussing the enactment of the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 19 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 20 Id. §§ 78a–77mm. 
 21 See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 727–28. 
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 Congress created the 1933 Act with two primary purposes.  
First, Congress sought to require that investors be provided with ma-
terial information regarding securities offered for public sale.22  Sec-
ond, Congress sought to prevent misrepresentation, fraud, and deceit 
in the sale of securities.23 
The 1933 Act has extensive provisions governing registrations 
and prospectuses and provides express causes of action if these provi-
sions are violated.24  Section 11 of the 1933 Act provides a private 
right of action for “any person acquiring a security” based on a regis-
tration “contain[ing] an untrue statement of a material fact or 
omitt[ing] to state a material fact required to be stated therein or 
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.”25  Section 
12(a)(1) of the 1933 Act26 provides a private right of action for any 
“person purchasing [a] security” against “any person who offers or 
sells a security” in violation of the registration and prospectus re-
quirements found in section 5 of the 1933 Act.27  Additionally, section 
12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act provides a private right of action for  
any “person purchasing [a] security” against a person offering to  
sell a security based on a prospectus or oral communication contain-
ing “an untrue statement of a material fact or omit[ting] to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements . . . not mis-
leading . . . .”28 
Congress created the 1934 Act for a variety of reasons relating to 
the “national public interest.”29  These reasons include: the important 
relationship between fair and honest markets and interstate com-
merce, the dangers of market manipulation, and the fear of national 
emergencies created by unreasonable fluctuations in security prices.30  
The 1934 Act contains a variety of provisions dealing with the regula-
 
 22 MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
1285 (8th ed. 2000) (discussing the public distribution of securities and the require-
ments of the 1933 Act). 
 23 Id. 
 24 See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 728 (discussing the content of the 1933 Act). 
 25 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000) (providing civil liabilities on account of false registra-
tion statements). 
 26 Id. § 77l(a)(1) (providing civil liabilities in connection with prospectuses and 
communications). 
 27 Id. § 77e. 
 28 Id. § 77l(a)(2) (providing civil liabilities in connection with prospectuses and 
communications). 
 29 Id. § 78b (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (providing the “necessity” for the regulation 
contained within the 1934 Act). 
 30 Id. 
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tion of securities, and section 4(a) of the 1934 Act established the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).31 
The 1934 Act also contains a number of express causes of action.  
Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act32 provides a private right of action for 
“any person who shall purchase or sell any security at a price” that was 
affected by a variety of manipulative acts described in sections 9(a), 
(b), and (c) of the 1934 Act.33  Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act provides 
a private right of action for recovery of short-swing, insider profits “by 
the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name 
and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring 
such suit . . . .”34  Additionally, section 18(a) of the 1934 Act provides 
a private right of action to “any person . . . who . . . shall have pur-
chased or sold a security” based on “false or misleading” statements 
made in filings to the SEC.35 
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act makes it unlawful for any person 
to “use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any  
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security 
not so registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance . . . .”36  To enforce section 10(b), the SEC may promulgate 
“such rules and regulations . . . as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors.”37  In 1942, by  
the authority granted in section 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule 
10b-5.38  Rule 10b-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of 
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a)  To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b)  To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
 
 31 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (establishing and describing the 
SEC). 
 32 Id. § 78i(e) (discussing persons liable in suits at law or in equity for manipula-
tion of security prices). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. § 78p(b) (discussing civil liability for insider profits from the purchase and 
sale, or sale and purchase, of a security within the same six month period). 
 35 Id. § 78r(a) (discussing liability for misleading statements made in SEC filings). 
 36 Id. § 78j. 
 37 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000). 
 38 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005). 
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(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.39 
Section 21(e) of the 1934 Act expressly grants the SEC the power to 
enforce section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and the other provisions of the 
1934 Act.40  Section 27 of the 1934 Act grants federal courts jurisdic-
tion over cases relating to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.41 
Although no express private right of action is provided under 
section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, courts have held that an implied private 
right action does exist.  In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,42 the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania became 
the first court to recognize a private civil remedy under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5.43 
In Kardon, Morris and Eugene Kardon (collectively the “Kar-
dons”) sued Leon and William Slavin (collectively the “Slavins”) and 
National Gypsum Company (“National Gypsum”) for allegedly violat-
ing section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.44  The Kardons and the Slavins both 
owned stock in Western Board and Paper Company (“Western Board 
and Paper”) and Michigan Stock and Paper Company (“Michigan 
Stock and Paper”).45  The Slavins secretly entered a deal to sell Na-
tional Gypsum the assets of Western Board and Paper,46 and the Slav-
ins then purchased the Kardons’ stock in both Western Board and 
Paper and Michigan Stock and Paper without revealing the deal with 
National Gypsum.47  The Kardons alleged that the Slavins and Na-
tional Gypsum had violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by partici-
pating in a conspiracy to fraudulently misrepresent the truth to in-
duce the Kardons to sell their stock at an artificially low value.48  In 
determining whether the Kardons had standing to seek relief under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the court relied on general tort law 
 
 39 Id. 
 40 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 41 Id. § 78aa (2000). 
 42 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
 43 Id. at 514. 
 44 Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800–01 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (provid-
ing the factual background for the 1946 opinion establishing a private right of action 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 45 Id. at 800. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 801. 
 48 Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
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principals.49  Quoting section 286 of the Restatement of Torts, the 
court wrote: 
“The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited 
act, or by failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an 
invasion of an interest of another if; (a) the intent of the enact-
ment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other as 
an individual; and (b) the interest invaded is one which the en-
actment is intended to protect.”50 
Because section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 had been enacted to protect 
those who had been the victim of stock manipulation, the court held 
that a private right of action does exist.51 
The Supreme Court did not address the existence of a private 
right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 until a quarter of 
a century later.52  After twenty-five years without comment,53 the Court 
simply stated in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty 
Co.: “It is now established that a private right of action is implied un-
der § 10(b).”54  The Court reached this holding because numerous 
lower courts had reached this conclusion during the twenty-five years 
between Kardon and Superintendent of Insurance.55 
B. Standing and the Purchaser-Seller Rule 
After the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania held that a private right of action exists under section 
 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934)). 
 51 Id. 
 52 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (noting 
that the Court did not address the existence of a private right of action under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 until twenty-five years after Kardon); Superintendent of Ins. v. 
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (providing the first discussion by 
the Supreme Court of Kardon and a private right of action under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5). 
 53 In fact, the Supreme Court did not even first interpret section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 until 1969.  See SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969) (“Although  
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may well be the most litigated provisions in the federal secu-
rities laws, this is the first time this Court has found it necessary to interpret them.”). 
 54 Superintendent of Ins., 404 U.S. at 13 n.9 (citations omitted) (providing the Su-
preme Court’s one-line holding that a private right of action exists under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 55 See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 730 (stating that by the time Superintendent of Insurance 
was heard by the Court, “the overwhelming consensus of the District Courts and 
Courts of Appeals [was] that such a cause of action did exist.”); but see infra Part IV.A 
(suggesting that the Supreme Court probably would hold that no private right of ac-
tion exists under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if the issue reached the Court for the 
first time today). 
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10(b) and Rule 10b-5,56 a plethora of questions were created regard-
ing who has standing to seek relief.  In 1951, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit took a major step by answering 
many of these questions in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.57  Birnbaum 
held that standing to sue under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is avail-
able only to plaintiffs who have purchased or sold securities in con-
nection with an alleged manipulative or deceptive act or omission.58 
Although the existence of exceptions is hotly debated and forms 
the basis of this Article, the purchaser-seller rule that was announced 
in Birnbaum remains in force today.59  In Birnbaum, a group of share-
holders sued on behalf of Newport Steel Corporation (“Newport 
Steel”) and other similarly situated shareholders for alleged violations 
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.60  The shareholders alleged that the 
president and various members the Newport Steel board of directors 
defrauded the shareholders by permitting the president to sell his 
forty percent of stock in Newport Steel for a large profit after reject-
ing a tender offer that would have been profitable to all of the share-
holders.61  The president and various other defendants moved to 
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because the shareholders and corporation 
did not purchase stock based on the alleged misrepresentation.62  The 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
agreed and dismissed the action.63 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court and 
held that to have standing, a plaintiff must have purchased or sold se-
curities in connection with an alleged manipulative or deceptive act 
or omission.64  The court made its decision by interpreting section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the context of the 1933 Act and the 1934 
Act.65  The court determined that the SEC had promulgated Rule 
10b-5 to protect “against fraud on a seller of securities by the pur-
 
 56 Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
 57 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). 
 58 Id. at 463. 
 59 See infra Part II.C (discussing possible exceptions to the purchaser-seller rule). 
 60 Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 462. 
 61 Id. at 462–63. 
 62 Id. at 462. 
 63 Id. at 463.  The distinguished panel deciding Birnbaum consisted of Chief 
Judge Swan, Judge Learned Hand, and Judge Augustus Hand.  Id. at 462.  Judge Au-
gustus Hand wrote the opinion of the court.  Id. 
 64 Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 463. 
 65 Id. at 463–64. 
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chaser if the latter was not a broker or a dealer.”66  Prior to the en-
actment of Rule 10b-5, section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and section 
15(c) of the 1934 Act represented the only prohibitions against fraud 
under federal securities law.67  Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act makes it 
unlawful to use fraudulent methods against a purchaser in the sale or 
offer of any security,68 and section 15(c) of the 1934 Act deals only 
with fraudulent practices by brokers and dealers in over-the-counter 
markets.69  In short, the court viewed Rule 10b-5 as a gap filler to pro-
tect sellers of securities who are not brokers or dealers.70  The court 
bolstered its holding by citing an SEC press release stating that Rule 
10b-5 was created to “‘prohibit[] individuals or companies from buy-
ing securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase.’”71  Because 
Rule 10b-5 was designed to protect sellers of securities, the Second 
Circuit held that standing under Rule 10b-5 requires the plaintiff to 
have purchased or sold securities in connection with an alleged ma-
nipulative or deceptive act or omission.72 
Notably, the court in Birnbaum rejected the argument that apply-
ing the purchaser-seller rule under Rule 10b-5 would render the 
words “in connection with” superfluous.  The court held that when 
read in the context of the 1933 Act and 1934 Act, the meaning of 
 
 66 Id. at 463. 
 67 Id. 
 68 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000). 
 69 Id. § 78o(c). 
 70 Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 463. 
 71 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 
(May 21, 1942), regarding the enactment of Rule 10b-5).  Ironically, in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, the SEC filed numerous amicus curiae briefs expressing its opposi-
tion to the purchaser-seller rule.  See, e.g., Mount Clemens Indus. Inc. v. Bell, 464 
F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir. 1972) (stating that the SEC in an amicus curiae brief had 
taken the position that Birnbaum was incorrectly decided); Drachman v. Harvey, 453 
F.2d 722, 738 (2d Cir. 1972) (“The Commission urges us to take this opportunity to 
review and repudiate the purchaser-seller requirement for 10b-5 actions which we 
enunciated in Birnbaum . . . .”); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 329 (2d Cir. 
1971) (stating that the SEC has suggested that the Second Circuit should overrule 
the purchaser-seller requirement); Iroquois Indus. Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 
F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1969) (noting that the SEC has asked the Second Circuit to 
overrule Birnbaum and has asserted that Birnbaum has been weakened by a number of 
subsequent opinions).  Prior to Blue Chip, the SEC also sought on two separate occa-
sions, without success, to amend section 10(b) from “‘in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security’” to “‘in connection with the purchase or sale of, or any 
attempt to purchase or sell, any security.’”  Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 
421 U.S. 723, 732 (1975). 
 72 Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 463. 
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Rule 10b-5 was “not difficult to ascertain,” even though the rule was 
“somewhat loosely drawn [in] its meaning.”73 
The Supreme Court waited over twenty years to address the rule 
announced in Birnbaum.74  In the interim, numerous reported cases 
reaffirmed Birnbaum’s holding that a plaintiff must have purchased or 
sold securities in connection with an alleged manipulative or decep-
tive act or omission to have standing to sue under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.75  In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the Supreme 
Court adopted the purchaser-seller rule that was announced in Birn-
baum.76  Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent, went so far as to say that 
Birnbaum is regarded as the “Mother Court” in this area of the law.77 
In Blue Chip, a company, Blue Chip Stamps, had been required 
to offer shares of its stock to a group of retailers as part of an antitrust 
consent decree.78  One of the retailers who did not purchase stock 
later sued Blue Chip Stamps on the grounds that Blue Chip Stamps 
allegedly issued an overly pessimistic appraisal of its status and future 
prospects to dissuade potential purchasers.79  The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California dismissed the com-
plaint on the ground that the retailer had not purchased or sold 
stock based on the alleged deception.80  A divided panel of the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the district court after reasoning that an exception to 
the purchaser-seller requirement was warranted under the circum-
stances.81 
 
 73 Id. 
 74 See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 731 (explaining that it took the Supreme Court over 
twenty years to address the purchaser-seller rule that was announced in Birnbaum).  
The Supreme Court declined the opportunity to rule on the purchaser-seller stand-
ing requirement in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 
6, 13 n.10 (1971).  In fact, the Court had the opportunity to rule on the purchaser-
seller standing requirement when it interpreted section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for the 
first time in 1969, but the Court opted to “enter . . . virgin territory cautiously.”  SEC 
v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969) (providing the Court’s first attempt at in-
terpreting section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 75 Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 731–32 (“[V]irtually all lower federal courts facing the is-
sue in the hundreds of reported cases presenting this question over the past quarter 
century have reaffirmed Birnbaum’s conclusion that the plaintiff class for purposes of 
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 private damage actions is limited to purchasers and sellers of 
securities.”); but see infra Part II.C (outlining various exceptions that developed in the 
interim between Birnbaum and the Supreme Court’s adoption of the purchaser-seller 
rule in Blue Chip). 
 76 Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 731. 
 77 Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 78 Id. at 726 (majority opinion). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 727. 
 81 Id. at 731. 
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On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court 
and held that the retailer had no standing to seek relief under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because the retailer had not purchased or 
sold based on the alleged deception.82  The Court based its holding 
largely on policy considerations because, as Justice Rehnquist,83 writ-
ing for the Court, put it, “neither the congressional enactment nor 
the administrative regulations offer conclusive guidance.”84  The 
Court’s decision to grant standing to sue for damages only to plain-
tiffs who purchased or sold based on allegedly misleading statements 
turned heavily on the Court’s fear that vexatious litigation would in-
crease dramatically without this requirement.85  The Court was con-
cerned that strike suits by plaintiffs seeking unjust enrichment would 
become commonplace without this requirement.86  Also, the Court 
was concerned that without this rule, courts would become the adju-
dicators of numerous “hazy issues of historical fact the proof of which 
depended almost entirely on oral testimony.”87 
C. Exceptions to the Purchaser-Seller Rule 
Even though Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores88 established 
that standing to sue for monetary damages under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 is limited only to plaintiffs who have purchased or sold se-
curities, the Supreme Court left open the question of whether various 
exceptions to the purchaser-seller rule exist.  This section examines a 
number of exceptions that developed between Birnbaum v. Newport 
Steel Corp.89 and Blue Chip. 
The Second Circuit announced the purchaser-seller rule in 
1952, and the Supreme Court did not endorse this holding until 
1975.90  Before the Supreme Court’s adoption of the Birnbaum rule in 
 
 82 Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 727, 753–55. 
 83 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, and Powell joined 
the opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice Rehnquist.  Id. at 725.  Justice Powell 
filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall.  Id. at 
755 (Powell, J., concurring).  Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion, which was 
joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan.  Id. at 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 84 Id. at 737 (majority opinion). 
 85 Id. at 737–49. 
 86 Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 741–43. 
 87 Id. at 743. 
 88 Id. at 753–55. 
 89 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). 
 90 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (noting that it took the Supreme 
Court over twenty years to endorse the purchaser-seller rule). 
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Blue Chip, the purchaser-seller rule had begun to significantly erode.91  
In the interim between these two opinions, at least four exceptions to 
the purchaser-seller rule developed.92  In fact, prior to Blue Chip, these 
exceptions lead some courts93 and commentators94 to question 
whether the purchaser-seller rule announced in Birnbaum had been 
rejected.95 
The four major exceptions that developed in the interim be-
tween Birnbaum and Blue Chip are the aborted transaction exception, 
the forced seller exception, the de facto purchaser-seller exception, 
and the injunctive relief exception.96  Blue Chip debatably left open 
whether three of these exceptions still exist.97  The four possible ex-
ceptions to the purchaser-seller rule are examined below. 
 
 91 See Bound Brook Water Co. v. Jaffe, 284 F. Supp. 702, 708 (D.N.J. 1968) (“One 
noticeable trend [was] the expansion of the concepts of purchaser and seller.  An-
other trend [was] the expansion of standing to sue on the part of non-sellers and 
non-purchasers where the allegedly wrongful activity [was] attributable to the con-
trolling faction in the corporation, and the result of that activity works to the detri-
ment of the corporation and the minority stockholders.”). 
 92 See Comment, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores: Failure to Solve the Pur-
chaser-Seller Problem, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 965, 985–93 (1976) (discussing the various ex-
ceptions to the Birnbaum rule). 
 93 See, e.g., Eason v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 
1973) (rejecting the purchaser-seller rule based in part because “[t]he course of ju-
dicial decision since 1952, when Birnbaum was decided, has actually recognized that 
the class of protected persons is broader than merely purchasers and sellers.”); 
Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490, 494 (D. Utah 1973) (rejecting the pur-
chaser-seller rule in favor of a rule that “[a]ctions under rule 10b-5 must be founded 
in fraud touching a securities transaction and must exhibit a direct and causal rela-
tionship between that fraud and the claimed injury”); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, 
Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 839 (D.N.J. 1972) (“The thrust of defendants’ jurisdictional 
argument seeks to revive the spectre of the Birnbaum buyer-seller doctrine at a point 
in time when both courts and legal scholars are seeking to bury it.”); Entel v. Allen, 
270 F. Supp. 60, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (stating that the Second Circuit cases after Birn-
baum “seriously challenge[d], if not overrule[d]” the purchaser-seller requirement). 
 94 See, e.g., Michael M. Boone & Patrick F. McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC 
Rule 10b-5, 49 TEX. L. REV. 617, 620 (1971) (“[R]ecent judicial interpretation has 
raised doubts about the present meaning and vitality of the [purchaser-seller] rule.” 
(footnote omitted)); Lewis D. Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New 
Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268, 275–77 (1968) (discussing the “demise” of the 
purchaser-seller rule); see also Note, Standing Under Rule 10b-5 After Blue Chip Stamps, 
75 MICH. L. REV. 413, 414 (1976) (“The repeated modification, circumvention, and 
outright rejection of the Birnbaum rule by the lower courts clearly undermined its 
force and appeared to portend its demise .”). 
 95 But see, e.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970) (“Bloody but 
unbowed, Birnbaum still stands.”). 
 96 See Comment, supra note 92, at 985–93. 
 97 Blue Chip did confirm that one means of circumventing the purchaser-seller 
rule does exist by way of derivative suits in which a shareholder brings an action on 
behalf of a corporation that has purchased or sold a security in connection with an 
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The first exception to the purchaser-seller rule that developed in 
the interim between Birnbaum and Blue Chip is the aborted transac-
tion exception.  In a small number of cases, courts were willing to cir-
cumvent the purchaser-seller rule when an alleged violation of sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prevented98 or delayed99 the consummation 
of a purchase or sale of securities. 
The Supreme Court rejected the aborted transaction exception 
in Blue Chip.100  As explained previously, a company, Blue Chip 
 
alleged manipulative or deceptive act or omission.  See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738 (1975) (“It has been held that [a] shareholder . . . 
may . . . circumvent the [purchaser-seller rule] through bringing a derivative action 
on behalf of the corporate issuer if the latter is itself a purchaser or seller of securi-
ties.”).  This is not an exception to the purchaser-seller rule because the standing 
imbues to the corporation itself, rather than a shareholder who did not purchase or 
sell in connection with the alleged deception.  See David W. Lamb, Recent Develop-
ments, Securities Fraud—Standing to Sue in 10b-5 Actions Requesting Injunctive Relief—
Requirement that Plaintiff be Purchaser or Seller, 52 TENN. L. REV. 755, 758–59 n.22 (1985) 
(noting that standing to sue on behalf of the corporation that purchased or sold se-
curities in connection with an alleged deception is not an exception to the pur-
chaser-seller rule); see also Rathborne v. Rathborne, 683 F.2d 914, 919 n.16 (5th Cir. 
1982) (“If a corporation has purchased or sold securities in a transaction tainted by 
fraud, the corporation may have a 10b-5 cause of action.  However, the corporation’s 
shareholders do not have standing to directly assert a claim which ‘belongs to’ the 
corporation.”). 
 98 See, e.g., Neuman v. Elec. Specialty Co., No. 68-C-1817, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13005, at *11–12 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 31, 1969) (finding standing under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 because the alleged deceptions prevented the plaintiffs from selling their 
shares during a tender offer); Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 
715, 718–19 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that standing under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 can be based on circumstances in which the defendant’s alleged fraud prevents 
a purchase or a sale); but see Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 593 (5th 
Cir. 1974) (holding that courts have “consistently” denied standing under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to stockholders who have allegedly been fraudulently induced 
to not sell their stock). 
 99 Silverman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 331 F. Supp. 1334, 1336 (E.D. Pa. 1971) 
(holding that a plaintiff had standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to pursue 
a claim against a broker who allegedly delayed in selling the securities of the plain-
tiff’s partnership); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) 
(“If plaintiffs indeed wished to sell their . . . shares and were induced to defer the 
sale by the fraudulent representations of the defendants, with the result that they ul-
timately sold at a greater loss, it follows . . . that the fraud was in connection with the 
sale of securities as that term is used in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”). 
 100 421 U.S. at 749–55; see also Gurley v. Documation, Inc., 674 F.2d 253, 255–56 
(4th Cir. 1982) (holding that in the wake of Blue Chip, courts have uniformly denied 
standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 based on alleged fraudulent induce-
ment to retain securities); O’Brien v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 
593 F.2d 54, 58 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding based on Blue Chip that the purchaser-seller 
requirement does not allow remedy to individuals who allege that they did not sell 
securities because of some fraudulent misrepresentation); Sacks v. Reynolds Sec., 
Inc., 593 F.2d 1234, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Blue Chip Stamps does not permit recov-
ery under Rule 10b-5 when alleged fraud causes an investor to retain ownership of 
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Stamps, had been required to offer shares of its stock to a group of 
retailers as part of an antitrust consent decree.101  One of the retailers 
alleged that it had failed to purchase shares because Blue Chip 
Stamps issued an overly pessimistic appraisal of its status and future 
prospects to dissuade potential purchasers.102  After reaffirming the 
purchaser-seller rule announced in Birnbaum, the Supreme Court re-
fused to make an exception to the purchaser-seller rule based on the 
alleged pessimistic appraisal that had prevented the retailer from 
purchasing stock in Blue Chip Stamps.103  In short, the Court held 
that the retailer’s aborted transaction by no means gave it standing to 
pursue an action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.104 
The Court did note that the outcome would have been different 
if the retailer had possessed a contractual right to purchase or sell se-
curities.105  This, however, should not be viewed as a validation of the 
aborted transaction exception.  Under section 3(a) of the 1934 Act, 
the terms “purchase” and “sale” are defined to include contractual 
rights to purchase and sell.106  Thus, a person or entity who has a con-
tractual right to buy or sell securities and fails to do so based on an al-
leged deception can still have standing to sue under section 10(b) 
 
securities.”); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir. 1977) (denying 
standing based on Blue Chip because the plaintiffs alleged that they were fraudulently 
induced not to sell their securities); Williams v. Sinclair, 529 F.2d 1383, 1389 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (denying standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to a group of indi-
viduals who retained their securities after an alleged deception). 
 101 Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 726. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 749–55. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 749 (“[P]rior cases have held that persons owning contractual rights to 
buy or sell securities are not excluded by the Birnbaum rule.”); see, e.g., Walling v. 
Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d 393, 395–97 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that alleged fraudu-
lent failure to perform under a contract to sell securities provides a basis for standing 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 
339, 345–46 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that a contractual right to purchase or sell se-
curities qualifies a plaintiff as a statutory purchaser for purposes of determining 
standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 
393, 395–97 (2d Cir 1967) (holding that a stockbroker had standing to bring suit 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for defendants’ alleged fraudulent failure to pay 
for securities that they had entered into an agreement to purchase through the bro-
ker); Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 367 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 1966) (permitting a 
suit under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for failure to carry out a contract for the sale 
of stock). 
 106 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (“The terms ‘buy’ and ‘pur-
chase’ each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire.”); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78c(14) (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (“The terms ‘sale’ and ‘sell’ each include any con-
tract to sell or otherwise dispose of.”). 
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and Rule 10b-5 without requiring an exception to the purchaser-
seller rule.107 
The second exception that developed between Birnbaum and 
Blue Chip is the forced seller exception.  Under the forced seller ex-
ception, an individual or entity has standing under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 if the individual or entity sues when left with no option 
other than to sell or convert a security.108 
For example, in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.,109 the Second Cir-
cuit held that a shareholder had standing to maintain an action un-
der the forced seller exception to the purchaser-seller rule even 
though an actual sale had not yet taken place.110  The shareholder 
sued because an allegedly fraudulent short form merger had left the 
shareholder with no other option than to sell his stock for an inade-
quate price or retain stock in a corporation that no longer existed.111  
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York dismissed the claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for lack 
of standing on the grounds that the shareholder had not purchased 
or sold in connection with an alleged manipulative or deceptive act 
or omission.112  The Second Circuit reversed and held that the share-
holder was a “seller” for purposes of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 be-
cause the actual sale of the shares was a “needless formality” when the 
shareholder was left with no other option but to sell.113 
The Supreme Court has never spoken on whether the forced 
seller exception survived the adoption of the Birnbaum rule in Blue 
 
 107 See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 749–55. 
 108 See, e.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 522–23 (8th Cir. 1973) 
(granting stockholders who did not sell their stock standing to sue under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as “forced sellers” because an open market for their stock had 
ceased to exist and the only possibility for sale of the stock was to the defendants on 
the defendants’ terms); Dudley v. Se. Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 308 (5th Cir. 
1971) (holding that standing exists under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when an “in-
vestment in a going enterprise has been commuted into a right . . . to a payment of 
money”); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that a 
shareholder will have standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a pur-
chase or a sale if the shareholder “has no choice but to surrender his interest in the 
corporation and to exchange his shares for cash”); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air 
Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 798 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that standing to sue exists un-
der section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when one becomes a “forced seller” based on an al-
leged deception); see generally Richard B. Gallagher, Annotation, Who is “Forced Seller” 
for Purposes of Maintenance of Civil Action Under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(15 USCS § 78j(b)) and SEC Rule 10b-5, 59 A.L.R. FED. 10 (1982). 
 109 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967). 
 110 Id. at 633–35. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 633. 
 113 Id. at 634. 
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Chip.  A number of courts have reaffirmed this exception since Blue 
Chip,114 and held that the forced seller exception to the purchaser-
seller requirement is still valid law.115 
A third exception that developed in the time between Birnbaum 
and Blue Chip is the de facto purchaser-seller exception.  Under this 
exception, an individual or entity with only a beneficial interest in a 
security will have standing to sue under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
if the security is purchased or sold in connection with an alleged ma-
nipulative or deceptive act or omission.116 
For example, in James v. Gerber Products Co.,117 the Sixth Circuit 
held that an individual who benefits from a sale of a security is a de 
facto seller and has standing to pursue an action under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5.  In that case, the beneficiary of two testamentary 
trusts alleged that the trustee had committed a violation of section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by selling stock from the trusts at less than fair 
market value to Gerber Products Company.118  The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the case 
because the beneficiary had neither purchased nor sold the stock 
herself.119 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the benefici-
ary did have standing to sue because she was a de facto seller of the 
 
 114 8 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3741 (3d ed. 2004) 
(discussing the current state of the law relating to the forced seller exception). 
 115 See, e.g., 7547 Corp. v. Parker & Parsley Dev. Partners, L.P., 38 F.3d 211, 228 
(5th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e do not believe that the teachings of Blue Chip Stamps would 
preclude standing as section 10(b) ‘forced sellers’ to investors of merged companies 
who can show a substantial change in the nature of their investments.”); Mayer v. Oil 
Field Sys. Corp., 721 F.2d 59, 65–68 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the forced seller ex-
ception survived Blue Chip); Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372, 1385–87 (5th Cir. 
1980) (reaffirming the forced seller exception and holding that it does not under-
mine the policy objective of Blue Chip); see also Jacobson v. AEG Capital Corp., 50 
F.3d 1493, 1499 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he forced sale doctrine does not cut a wide 
swath.  Although recognized by the Ninth Circuit, we have rarely encountered in-
stances where it applies.”); but see Isquith v. Caremark Int’l, Inc., 136 F.3d 531, 535–
36 (7th Cir. 1998) (questioning the continued existence of the forced seller excep-
tion). 
 116 See, e.g., Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958, 964–66 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (hold-
ing that a trust beneficiary had standing to seek relief under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security because the beneficiary had been a 
de facto seller of the securities in the trust); but see Rippey v. Denver U.S. Nat’l Bank, 
260 F. Supp. 704, 715–16 (D. Colo. 1966) (holding that trust beneficiaries could not 
maintain an action against a trustee because having a beneficial interest in the secu-
rities at issue did not allow them to be purchasers or sellers for purposes of section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 117 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973). 
 118 Id. at 945. 
 119 Id. at 946. 
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securities.120  The court reached its holding because conferring stand-
ing to the beneficiary was consistent with the interests served by sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to protect investors “from those who deal 
unfairly with them.”121  The court stated that “novel or atypical trans-
actions [were] not to be excluded from” the ambit of section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5.122 
It is unclear whether the de facto purchaser-seller exception was 
overruled by Blue Chip.  If Blue Chip provides a bright line rule, then 
the de facto purchaser-seller exception is likely invalid because de 
facto purchasers or sellers are not actual purchasers or sellers.  A 
number of lower courts, however, have reaffirmed the de facto pur-
chaser-seller exception since Blue Chip.123  The validity of this excep-
tion will ultimately have to be addressed by the Supreme Court, 
unless Congress acts first. 
The fourth exception to the purchaser-seller rule involves ac-
tions for injunctive relief to prevent prospective fraudulent con-
duct.124  In the interim between Birnbaum and Blue Chip, a number of 
 
 120 Id. at 948–50. 
 121 Id. at 948. 
 122 Id. at 949. 
 123 See, e.g., Grubb v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 1151, 1161–62 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding 
standing to sue under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a 
security for a plaintiff who guaranteed a loan that was used by a holding company to 
purchase stock because the plaintiff was the actual party at risk); Norris v. Wirtz, 719 
F.2d 256, 259–61 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that a trust beneficiary that sold securities 
had standing to bring an action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because alleg-
edly fraudulent misrepresentations had been made directly to the beneficiary who 
had the right to approve the sale and had experienced the direct impact of the al-
leged fraud); Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 240–41 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding 
that a trust beneficiary may sue a trustee under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for 
frauds committed by a trustee); Hackford v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 521 F. 
Supp. 541, 549 (D. Utah 1981) (holding that trust beneficiaries have standing to 
bring actions under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because the beneficiaries feel the 
impact of any fraud, rather than the trustee).  Some courts, however, have declined 
to grant standing to trust beneficiaries when total investment authority has been 
delegated to a trustee.  See Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Kid-
der Peabody & Co., 800 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the court could 
not imply a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when the plaintiff had trans-
ferred full authority to make investment decisions to the defendant); O’Brien v. 
Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 593 F.2d 54, 59–63 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(holding that a trust beneficiary does not have standing under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 to sue a trustee who has total discretionary power to purchase and sell se-
curities because an alleged misrepresentation could not be “in connection with” the 
purchase or sale of a security). 
 124 Courts have held that this exception does not apply when the fraud sought to 
be enjoined has already been completed.  See, e.g., Doll v. James Martin Assocs. 
(Holdings), Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 510, 522 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (holding that the injunc-
tive relief exception applies “only when plaintiff seeks ‘prophylactic relief’, i.e. a pro-
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courts held that the purchaser-seller rule applied only to actions for 
monetary damages, rather than actions for injunctive relief.125  Blue 
Chip left open whether the injunctive relief exception to the pur-
chaser-seller rule still exists. 
After Blue Chip, the circuit courts split on whether an individual 
or entity can have standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to 
seek injunctive relief without the purchase or sale of a security.126  A 
number of courts have reached the conclusion that actions for in-
 
hibition against future violation of the securities laws”); Bertozzi v. King Louie Int’l, 
Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1166, 1177 (D.R.I. 1976) (holding that the injunctive relief excep-
tion to the purchaser-seller requirement applies only “to prevent consummation of 
[the] resultant injury from an asserted § 10(b)/10b-5 violation”); Petersen v. Feder-
ated Dev. Co., 387 F. Supp 355, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (“Although a stockholder has 
been permitted to seek injunctive relief against threatened or continuing fraud, he 
lacks standing to seek injunctive relief once the fraud has been consummated.” (cita-
tion omitted)); Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding 
that the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller rule does not apply in 
situations in which the alleged fraudulent exchange has been fully completed); see 
also infra note 186 (citing case law holding that a corporate issuer will only have 
standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if the issuer can 
demonstrate that the continuation of the alleged deception will cause some injury to 
the issuer). 
 125 See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156 (3d Cir. 1973) (“An injunction suit, 
as distinguished from an action for damages, will therefore, in appropriate circum-
stances, be permitted under [section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] even though the com-
plainant is not a purchaser or seller.”); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d 
Cir. 1970) (holding that an individual or entity does not have to purchase or sell se-
curities to have standing to bring an action for injunctive relief under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5); Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433, 435–36 (6th Cir. 1969) (allow-
ing an action for injunctive relief based on section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to proceed 
despite the fact that the plaintiff neither purchased nor sold stock based on the al-
leged deception); Mut. Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546–47 (2d Cir. 
1967) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to pursue injunctive relief under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or sale of securities); Moore v. 
Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490, 492 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (holding that a corpo-
rate issuer had standing to sue for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security); but see Greater Iowa Corp. v. 
McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 791–92 (8th Cir. 1967) (applying the purchaser-seller rule 
to deny standing in an action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for injunctive re-
lief and not commenting regarding possible differing treatment for standing in ac-
tions for injunctive relief, rather than actions for monetary damages). 
 126 See HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.7[2] (“There is authority to the effect that a per-
son need be neither a purchaser nor a seller of securities in order to maintain an ac-
tion for injunctive relief under Rule 10b-5.  There is also some authority to the con-
trary.” (footnotes omitted)); Liberty Nat’l Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 
545, 557 n.27 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourts addressing the question of whether a cause 
of action exists for a non-purchaser-seller have come down on each side of the is-
sue.”).  Even prior to Blue Chip, the circuit courts were divided on the existence of an 
injunctive relief exception.  See supra note 125. 
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junctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are not subject to 
the purchaser-seller requirement.127 
The Second Circuit, for example, has recognized that a plaintiff 
does not need to be a purchaser or seller to have standing to sue for 
injunctive relief.128  The Southern District of New York has even stated 
that standing to sue for injunctive relief is “well-established” Second 
Circuit precedent.129 
The Second Circuit first recognized the injunctive relief excep-
tion to the purchaser-seller requirement in 1967.  In Mutual Shares 
Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.,130 the Second Circuit held that an entity can have 
standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
without the purchase or sale of a security.  In that case, various share-
holders of S.H. Kress and Company (“Kress”) sued Genesco, Inc. 
(“Genesco”) for damages and injunctive relief under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 based on an alleged “fraudulent conspiracy” to gain 
control of Kress.131  The United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York dismissed the claim based on lack of federal 
question jurisdiction for failing to state a claim under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5.132 
The Second Circuit reversed in part and held that the share-
holders could pursue the claim for injunctive relief under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or sale of a security.133  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court noted that although the SEC 
could bring an action to halt any fraudulent practices, shareholders 
could play a significant role in enforcement of section 10(b) and 
 
 127 See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 526 F.2d 1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that the 
purchaser-seller requirement does not apply to actions for injunctive relief); Granada 
Invs., Inc. v. DWG Corp., 717 F. Supp. 533, 535 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (holding that “suits 
for prospective injunctive relief pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act may 
be brought by plaintiffs who are not actual purchasers or sellers”); USG Corp. v. 
Wagner & Brown, 689 F. Supp. 1483, 1493–94 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that a corpo-
rate issuer and a shareholder had standing to seek injunctive relief under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because of the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-
seller rule); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Res. Ltd., 574 F. Supp. 1172, 1198 
(N.D. Ohio 1982) (holding that an issuer could maintain an action for injunctive re-
lief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security); 
Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1358–59 (N.D. Tex. 
1979) (holding that the purchaser-seller rule announced in Blue Chip does not apply 
to actions for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 128 See infra note 138. 
 129 Langner v. Brown, 913 F. Supp. 260, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 130 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). 
 131 Id. at 542. 
 132 Id. at 543. 
 133 Id. at 546–47. 
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Rule 10b-5 by allowing standing to seek injunctive relief without the 
purchase or sale of a security.134  The court opted to treat injunctive 
relief differently from damages because injunctive relief does not suf-
fer from the same issues regarding “proof of loss and the causal con-
nection with the alleged violation of the Rule.”135  The court also 
noted that injunctive relief helps to prophylactically prevent harm to 
continuing shareholders.136 
The Second Circuit’s adoption of the injunctive relief exception 
is noteworthy because the Second Circuit was the “Mother Court”137 
for the purchaser-seller rule.  Mutual Shares is just one in a long line 
of Second Circuit opinions applying this exception.138 
All courts, however, have not adopted the injunctive relief ex-
ception to the purchaser-seller rule that was announced in Blue Chip.  
Some courts have yet to take a definitive position on the issue,139 and 
 
 134 Id. at 547. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Mut. Shares, 384 F.2d at 547. 
 137 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) (discussing the importance of Birnbaum). 
 138 See, e.g., Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc., 186 
F.3d 157, 170–71 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the purchaser-seller requirement does 
not apply in actions for injunctive relief); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 
(2d Cir. 1981) (“[T]his Court, and other Courts of Appeals as well, [have] held that a 
plaintiff need not be a defrauded purchaser or seller in order to sue for injunctive 
relief under Rule 10b-5.”); Langner v. Brown, 913 F. Supp. 260, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(holding that the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller requirement is 
“well-established” in the Second Circuit); Packer v. Yampol, 630 F. Supp. 1237, 1241–
42 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (recognizing that plaintiffs who are seeking injunctive relief, 
rather than damages, need not satisfy the purchaser-seller requirement); Fuchs v. 
Swanton Corp., 482 F. Supp. 83, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“It has long been held in this 
Circuit that a suit for injunctive relief under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act may 
be maintained by plaintiffs who are not actual purchasers or sellers of securities in 
connection with the challenged  transactions.”); Monheit v. Carter, 376 F. Supp. 334, 
342 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding that a plaintiff does not need to be a purchaser or a 
seller of securities to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 139 See, e.g., Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 
478, 486 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that the Third Circuit has not addressed whether the 
injunctive relief exception survived Blue Chip and opting to make that decision at 
some later time); but see Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Edelman, No. 87-4346 (GEB), 1987 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16783, at *9–12 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 1987) (holding that an exception to 
the Blue Chip rule exists for injunctive relief until the Third Circuit states otherwise); 
see also, e.g., Advanced Res. Int’l, Inc. v. Tri-Star Petroleum Co., 4 F.3d 327, 332 (4th 
Cir. 1993) (declining to decide whether the injunctive relief exception exists but 
placing restrictions on any exception to the purchaser-seller standing requirement 
that might exist); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Bader & Dufty, 627 F.2d 221, 223 
(10th Cir. 1980) (reserving for future determination whether the purchaser-seller 
rule that was announced in Blue Chip applies to actions in which only injunctive relief 
is sought). 
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a number of courts have even held that no exception exists for plain-
tiffs seeking injunctive relief.140 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, for example, has concluded that the injunctive relief excep-
tion did not survive the Supreme Court’s holding in Blue Chip.  In 
Cowin v. Bresler,141 the D.C. Circuit held that the purchaser-seller rule 
is applicable regardless of whether a plaintiff seeks monetary dam-
ages or injunctive relief.  In that case, a minority shareholder of 
Bresler & Reiner, Inc. alleged that the majority shareholders had vio-
lated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by issuing deceptive reports to the 
shareholders and concealing material information regarding the 
corporation.142  The minority shareholder did not assert that he pur-
chased or sold based on the alleged deception, but he claimed that 
his stock was made less valuable based on the majority shareholders’ 
misrepresentations to the investing public generally.143  The minority 
shareholder did not seek monetary damages but sought injunctive re-
lief requiring an end to the alleged deceptions and disclosure of past 
deceptions.144  The United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia held that the minority shareholder had standing to assert his 
claims under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but dismissed the claims 
on other grounds.145 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that the minority shareholder 
had no standing to pursue his action for injunctive relief under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because he did not satisfy the purchaser-
 
 140 See, e.g., Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the 
purchase or sale requirement applies to both actions for damages and actions for in-
junctive relief); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Edelman, No. C-87-274-G, 1987 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9624, at *4–7 (M.D.N.C. July 30, 1987) (holding that an issuer of stock could 
not have standing to sue for injunctive relief unless it was in connection with a pur-
chase or sale based on the alleged misrepresentation); Atl. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of 
Fort Lauderdale v. Dade Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 592 F. Supp. 1089, 1092 (S.D. Fla. 1984) 
(denying standing to an issuer and stockholder under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
in an action for injunctive relief without mention of the injunctive relief exception 
because the issuer and the stockholder failed to allege that they were purchasers or 
sellers); W.A. Krueger Co. v. Kirkpatrick, Pettis, Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800, 
805–06 (D. Neb. 1979) (holding that actions for injunctive relief under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 are subject to the purchaser-seller requirement); Wright v. Heizer 
Corp., 411 F. Supp. 23, 34 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (holding that Blue Chip is applicable to 
both actions at law and at equity), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 
1977). 
 141 741 F.2d at 423. 
 142 Id. at 412. 
 143 Id. at 419. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 413 n.1. 
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seller rule.146  In reaching its holding, the court stated that most of the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning for employing the purchaser-seller rule 
in Blue Chip applied regardless of whether a plaintiff is seeking dam-
ages or injunctive relief.  Judge Bork, writing for the D.C. Circuit, also 
relied heavily on the text of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: 
The scope of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is limited to fraud “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.”  Congress was 
asked on two different occasions to expand the jurisdictional 
reach of those provisions but chose not to.  In contrast, Congress 
did choose to define the scope of other provisions in the 1933 
and 1934 Acts in terms that clearly reflected a broader jurisdic-
tional reach.  Congress also limited standing in those instances 
where it did create express remedies under the Act to a class of 
persons including only purchasers or sellers.147 
Judge Bork went on to say that fashioning a different concept for 
cases involving injunctive relief, rather than monetary damages would 
be “altogether too awkward to be persuasive.”148 
Simply put, courts are divided on the existence of an injunctive 
relief exception to the purchaser-seller rule that was announced in 
Blue Chip.  Unless Congress acts, the Supreme Court will ultimately 
have to decide whether this exception and various other exceptions 
to the purchaser-seller rule continue to exist. 
III. CORPORATE ISSUER STANDING AND ITS POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS. 
Most cases waiving the purchaser-seller rule have been brought 
by shareholder plaintiffs.149  Some courts, however, are cautious but 
willing to grant corporate issuers standing under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 to seek injunctive relief without a purchase or a sale.150  
 
 146 Id. at 423–25. 
 147 Cowin, 741 F.2d at 424. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 963 F. Supp. 395, 
399 (D.N.J. 1997) (evaluating the existence and scope of the injunctive relief excep-
tion to the purchaser-seller rule). 
 150 See, e.g., Gen. Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 
1968) (“There are many practical advantages . . . in allowing a corporation in certain 
cases to enjoin manipulation of its stock, although courts must act both with speed 
and with caution lest such actions become vehicles for management to thwart pur-
chases in the true interest of the stockholder.”); USG Corp. v. Wagner & Brown, 689 
F. Supp. 1483, 1493–94 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (allowing a corporate issuer to seek injunc-
tive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a secu-
rity); Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Edelman, No. 87-4346 (GEB), 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16783, at *8–12 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 1987) (recognizing standing for an issuer to seek in-
junctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a 
security); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Res. Ltd., 574 F. Supp. 1172, 1198 
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For instance, an issuer may have standing under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 to seek injunctive relief without a purchase or sale in cir-
cumstances in which an issuer has suffered or will suffer direct injury 
because of the alleged manipulation or in which the issuer would be 
the most appropriate party to assert a violation affecting all its share-
holders.151 
Courts have substantial power in determining whether a corpo-
rate issuer has standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or a sale because the private right 
of action under these provisions is judicially implied.152  In Blue Chip, 
the Supreme Court relied on policy considerations in adopting the 
purchaser-seller rule because “neither the congressional enactment 
nor the administrative regulations offer[ed] conclusive guidance.”153 
Policy considerations will play a key role when the Supreme 
Court ultimately rules on whether any exception survived the adop-
tion of the purchaser-seller requirement in Blue Chip.154  Of course, 
the statutory schemes of the 1933 Act155 and the 1934 Act156 will need 
to be taken into account in any standing analysis,157 but the Supreme 
Court has made clear that the implied right of action under section 
 
(N.D. Ohio 1982) (holding that an issuer could maintain an action for injunctive re-
lief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security); 
see also Standard Metals Corp. v. Tomlin, 503 F. Supp. 586, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (re-
fusing to employ or extend the scope of the narrow exception to the purchaser-seller 
rule for issuers seeking injunctive relief because other grounds for relief were avail-
able); but see Liberty Nat’l Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 554–59 
(11th Cir. 1984) (holding that an issuer does not have standing to bring an action for 
injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or a sale); 
W.A. Krueger Co. v. Kirkpatrick, Pettis, Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800, 805–06 
(D. Neb. 1979) (holding that an issuer must allege a purchase or sale of stock to 
bring an action for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 151 See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 722 n.27 (2d Cir. 1971) (“We do 
not foreclose the possibility, for example, that an issuer might have standing under 
10b-5 to seek injunctive relief in circumstances where, despite the absence of a pur-
chase or sale, it has suffered or will suffer direct injury because of the alleged fraud, 
or where it would be the most appropriate party to assert 10b-5 violations affecting all 
of its shareholders.”). 
 152 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748–49 (1975) (discuss-
ing the purchaser-seller rule and the possible existence of an injunctive relief excep-
tion). 
 153 Id. at 737. 
 154 See supra Part I (discussing the Supreme Court’s wide discretion in determining 
standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because it is a judicially implied private 
right of action). 
 155 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 156 Id. §§ 78a–77mm. 
 157 See Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[I]n the process of 
implying private rights judges must take account of the statutory scheme.”). 
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10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has grown far beyond the text of the statute 
and the administrative rule.158 
In determining whether a corporate issuer has standing to seek 
injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the pur-
chase or sale of a security, strong policy justifications exist for such an 
exception to the purchaser-seller rule.  Although the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Blue Chip foreclosed a corporate issuer’s standing 
to seek monetary damages without the purchase or sale of a secu-
rity,159 current case law suggests that the purchaser-seller rule might 
not apply in cases in which a corporate issuer seeks injunctive relief.160  
Such an exception is justified for a corporate issuer seeking injunctive 
relief because of the nature of injunctive relief, the injury to the is-
suer, and the role of the issuer as best champion of its shareholders.  
These policy justifications are examined below. 
A. The Nature of Injunctive Relief 
The first policy justification for allowing a corporate issuer stand-
ing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with-
out a purchase or a sale of a security relates to the nature of injunc-
tive relief in comparison to monetary damages.  Injunctive relief is 
substantially different from monetary damages and merits different 
treatment by the courts.  Allowing actions for injunctive relief under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a secu-
rity does not create the same concerns about unjust enrichment, is 
consistent with the purposes underlying the securities acts, and is 
consistent with the terms of the 1934 Act. 
Actions for injunctive relief do not generate the same concerns 
as actions for monetary damages because injunctive relief does not 
create the same possibility for unjust enrichment.  In Blue Chip, the 
policy justifications cited by the Supreme Court for adopting the pur-
chaser-seller rule in actions involving monetary relief stemmed from 
concerns regarding the possibility of unscrupulous plaintiffs receiving 
windfall settlements and judgments.161  Based on the fear of vexatious 
 
 158 See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 737 (“When we deal with private actions under Rule 
10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative 
acorn.”). 
 159 See id. at 731–32 (holding that the purchaser-seller rule requires plaintiffs to be 
purchasers and sellers “for purposes of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 private damage ac-
tions”); LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 114, at 3735 n.625 (“[A]n issuer that is neither a 
purchaser nor a seller lacks standing under § 10(b), at least to sue for damages.”). 
 160 See supra Part II.C (discussing the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-
seller rule). 
 161 See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 739–49. 
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litigation,162 the Supreme Court stated two policy justifications that 
mandated the adoption of the purchaser-seller rule.163  The Court 
first cited its concern that strike suits would become commonplace in 
the absence of the purchaser-seller rule.164  The Court was worried 
about expanding the class of plaintiffs under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 to allow actions that would have settlement value out of propor-
tion to any prospective success at trial.165  Second, the Court was con-
cerned that allowing standing to sue for monetary damages under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would subject the trier of fact to many 
“rather hazy issues of historical fact.”166  In assessing this risk, Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated, “The very real risk . . . is 
that the door will be open to recovery of substantial damages . . . .”167  
In short, both of the Court’s policy justifications are chiefly based on 
the fear that allowing a plaintiff standing to seek monetary relief un-
der section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or a sale raises a 
substantial possibility of unworthy plaintiffs being unjustly enriched. 
Allowing an issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security 
does not create the same danger of unjust enrichment that the Su-
preme Court used to justify its adoption of the purchaser-seller rule 
in actions for monetary damages.  Although economic concerns are 
implicated in actions for injunctive relief, injunctive relief provides an 
across-the-board benefit to all shareholders of a corporation and 
promotes the well-being of the corporation itself.168  Allowing an is-
 
 162 See id. at 739 (“There has been widespread recognition that litigation under 
Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from 
that which accompanies litigation in general.”). 
 163 Id. at 739–49. 
 164 Id. at 740–43. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 743. 
 167 Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 746. 
 168 Notably, allowing an issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security helps to protect vari-
ous classes of individuals who would not be allowed to seek monetary relief under 
these provisions because of the purchaser-seller requirement.  In Blue Chip, the Court 
outlined the three classes of potential plaintiffs who are barred by the purchaser-
seller requirement: 
First are potential purchasers of shares, either in a new offering or on 
the Nation’s post-distribution trading markets, who allege that they de-
cided not to purchase because of an unduly gloomy representation or 
the omission of favorable material which made the issuer appear to be 
a less favorable investment vehicle than it actually was.  Second are ac-
tual shareholders in the issuer who allege that they decided not to sell 
their shares because of an unduly rosy representation or a failure to 
disclose unfavorable material.  Third are shareholders, creditors, and 
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suer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security does not create a 
windfall for unscrupulous plaintiffs, and the Supreme Court’s policy 
justifications in Blue Chip do not apply because the possibility of wind-
fall judgments and settlements is not present.169 
In fact, allowing a corporate issuer standing to seek injunctive re-
lief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is consistent with the pur-
poses that underlie securities acts.  As stated previously,170 Congress 
promulgated the 1933 Act (1) to require that investors be provided 
with material information regarding securities offered for public sale 
and (2) to prevent misrepresentation, fraud, and deceit in the sale of 
securities.171  Congress created the 1934 Act for a variety of reasons re-
lating to the “national public interest,” e.g., the important relation-
ship between fair and honest markets and interstate commerce, the 
dangers of market manipulation, and the fear of national emergen-
cies created by unreasonable fluctuations in security prices.172  In 
short, Congress wanted to protect the integrity of securities transac-
tions through fair disclosure of information regarding these securi-
ties. 
Allowing a corporate issuer standing to seek injunctive relief un-
der section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or sale of a se-
curity is consistent with the purposes of the securities acts because in-
junctive relief allows the issuer to help correct a manipulative or 
 
perhaps others related to an issuer who suffered loss in the value of 
their investment due to corporate or insider activities in connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities which violate Rule 10b-5. 
Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 737–38.  By adopting the purchaser-seller requirement, the 
Court denied standing to these three classes of potential plaintiffs.  Id.  The Court 
admitted that some worthy plaintiffs would not be able to seek monetary damages 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because of the purchaser-seller requirement, but 
the Court still adopted the requirement because of concerns regarding vexatious liti-
gation without the requirement.  Id. at 738–39.  Allowing an issuer standing to seek 
injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a 
security helps to protect the classes of plaintiffs who are denied relief by the pur-
chaser-seller requirement because the issuer can correct an ongoing deceptive or 
manipulative act that would cause harm to all classes of potential plaintiffs, rather 
than just purchasers or sellers. 
 169 But see infra Part IV.B (discussing possible misuse of section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 by corporate directors for purposes of management entrenchment). 
 170 See supra Part II.A (discussing the advent of federal securities laws). 
 171 EISENBERG, supra note 22, at 1285 (discussing the public distribution of securi-
ties and the requirements of the 1933 Act). 
 172 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (providing the “necessity” for the regu-
lation contained within the 1934 Act). 
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deceptive act or omission.173  For example, in Moore v. Greatamerica 
Corp.,174 the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio held that an issuer had standing to seek injunctive relief under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a secu-
rity because it was consistent with the public policy underlying the 
statute and the rule.  In that case, The Glidden Company (“Glidden”) 
sought injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against 
Greatamerica Corporation (“Greatamerica”) based on allegedly de-
ceptive statements made in connection with a tender offer to pur-
chase Glidden stock.175  Even though Glidden had not bought or sold 
based on the allegedly deceptive statements, the court held that 
Glidden had standing to seek injunctive relief to keep Greatamerica 
from moving forward with the tender offer.176  In reaching this hold-
ing, the court relied upon the “sound public policy” underlying sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to “protect the unwary and the inexperi-
enced buyers and sellers” and “to eliminate any undesirable 
practices.”177 
In contrast to actions for monetary damages under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5, actions for injunctive relief should not be subject to 
the purchaser-seller rule because they directly serve the reasons Con-
gress passed the securities acts.  Damages actions under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 are backward-looking because they are remedial in 
nature.  In contrast, actions for injunctive relief under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 are forward-looking because they seek to correct an 
ongoing fraud.178  Simply put, actions for injunctive relief protect the 
integrity of securities transactions by forcing the fair disclosure of in-
formation regarding securities.179  Allowing issuers standing to seek 
 
 173 See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 722 n.27 (2d Cir. 1971) (“The is-
suer, for example, may have standing to enjoin a manipulative scheme which had the 
effect of depressing the price of the issuer’s stock immediately prior to a contem-
plated issue of securities, or it may have standing to enjoin a fraud whose purpose 
was to inflate the market value of the stock of a company with which the issuer was 
negotiating a merger.”). 
 174 274 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ohio 1967). 
 175 Id. at 492. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 See supra note 124, infra note 186 (providing case law holding that the injunc-
tive relief exception applies only to ongoing fraud). 
 179 See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that the in-
junctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller requirement is “premised on the pol-
icy of the Securities Exchange Act to eliminate deceptive and unfair practices in se-
curity trading and to protect the public from inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading 
information”); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir. 1970) (recognizing 
standing for plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
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injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 dovetails into 
the purposes for which the 1933 Act and 1934 Act were created in a 
way that actions for monetary damages do not. 
Additionally, allowing a corporate issuer standing under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or a sale is consistent with 
the terms of the 1934 Act.  In Blue Chip, one of the arguments that 
the Court offered in favor of the purchaser-seller rule was that section 
28(a) of the 1934 Act180 required that any private damages action 
brought under the 1934 Act be limited to “actual damages.”181  Sec-
tion 28(a) in relevant part provides, “[N]o person permitted to main-
tain a suit for damages under [the 1934 Act] shall recover, through 
satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in 
excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of.”182  
In Blue Chip, the Court stated its concern that in the absence of the 
purchaser-seller rule, determining damages based on failure to pur-
chase or sell would be highly speculative and uncertain.183 
Section 28(a) does not pose a concern in actions for injunctive 
relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  The Supreme Court’s rea-
soning that section 28(a) validates the purchaser-seller rule is inappo-
site because actions for injunctive relief do not involve an award of 
“actual damages.”184  In sum, injunctive relief varies greatly from ac-
tions for monetary damage, and different treatment for actions for in-
junctive relief and actions for monetary relief is not in conflict with 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Blue Chip. 
 
without a purchase or a sale because “[t]he thrust of the [1934] Act and the deci-
sions interpreting it is to give the investing public the opportunity to make knowing 
and intelligent decisions regarding the purchase or sale of securities”); Granada 
Invs., Inc. v. DWG Corp., 717 F. Supp. 533, 536 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (“The policies em-
bodied in the Exchange Act of eliminating deceptive and unfair practices in securi-
ties trading and protecting the public from inaccurate and misleading information 
are clearly advanced by permitting aggrieved shareholders to bring suits to enjoin 
wrongful acts.”); Moore v. Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490, 492 (N.D. Ohio 
1967) (recognizing standing for an issuer to seek injunctive relief under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security because it furthers 
the policies underlying the statute and rule). 
 180 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2000). 
 181 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734–35 (1975). 
 182 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2000). 
 183 Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 734–35 (“In contrast, a putative plaintiff, who neither 
purchases nor sells securities but sues instead for intangible economic injury such as 
loss of a noncontractual opportunity to buy or sell, is more likely to be seeking a 
largely conjectural and speculative recovery in which the number of shares involved 
will depend on the plaintiff’s subjective hypothesis.”). 
 184 Id. 
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B. Irreparable Injury to the Issuer 
In The Law of Securities Regulation, Professor Thomas Lee Hazen 
writes, “[E]ven among those courts that do not require the plaintiff 
in an injunction action to have been a purchaser or seller, the plain-
tiff must still be able to show some direct injury resulting from the al-
leged Rule 10b-5 violation.”185  A corporate issuer will only have stand-
ing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if the 
issuer can demonstrate that the continuation of the alleged decep-
tion will cause some injury to the issuer.186 
In Avnet, Inc. v. Scope Industries,187 for example, because a corpo-
rate issuer had failed to plead any injury, the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York held that the issuer 
could not maintain an action for injunctive relief under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5.  In that case, Avnet, Inc. (“Avnet”) brought suit 
against a shareholder for an alleged manipulative scheme to gain 
greater control of the corporation.188  Avnet requested that the share-
holder be enjoined from further action, unless the shareholder cor-
rected the alleged misrepresentations.189  After recognizing a corpo-
rate issuer’s right to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, the court held that the shareholder had failed to allege 
 
 185 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.7[2] (discussing standing to seek injunctive relief 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 186 See, e.g., Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 
478, 486 (3d Cir. 1998) (opting not to rule on the existence of the injunctive relief 
exception to the purchaser-seller requirement because the plaintiff had failed to es-
tablish any causal link between its alleged loss and the alleged violation of section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5); Advanced Res. Int’l, Inc. v. Tri-Star Petroleum Co., 4 F.3d 
327, 333 (4th Cir. 1993) (declining to decide whether an injunctive relief exception 
to the purchaser-seller rule exists and denying standing to seek injunctive relief un-
der section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to a plaintiff whose injuries were “too far removed, 
causally, from the sale or purchase of securities . . . even under a relaxed rule appli-
cable to injunctive relief cases”); Granada Invs., Inc. v. DWG Corp., 717 F. Supp. 533, 
535 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (“A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate, 
through the use of substantial and verifiable evidence, that he will be injured by the 
continuation of past and present wrongdoing.”); Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Edelman, 
No. 87-4346 (GEB), 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16783, at *10–12 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 1987) 
(holding that to have standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security a causal connection must be estab-
lished between the alleged wrong and the harm suffered); Hundahl v. United Bene-
fit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1359 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (“A plaintiff requesting in-
junctive relief [under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] must demonstrate that the 
continuation of past and present practices will injure him.”); see also supra note 124. 
 187 499 F. Supp. 1121, 1128–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
 188 Id. at 1123. 
 189 Id. 
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sufficient injury to maintain its action.190  The court wrote, “The com-
plaint alleges market manipulation, but does not specify how that 
manipulation injured Avnet, why or how Avnet may be the best 
champion of its shareholders’ rights here, or any other reason to al-
low it to sue under Rule 10b-5 here.”191  Put simply, without injury, an 
issuer has no standing. 
When a corporate issuer seeks injunctive relief under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or a sale of a security, the 
injury to the issuer helps to justify standing and provides a reason to 
make an exception to the purchaser-seller requirement.  Allowing an 
issuer standing to seek injunctive relief protects the issuer from being 
crippled by manipulative acts and mitigates damages from a fraud or 
deception. 
A corporate issuer should be allowed standing under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because securities manipulation may have crip-
pling results.  When Congress codified the “Necessity for Regulation” 
in the 1934 Act, it stated that securities markets “constitute an impor-
tant part of the current of interstate commerce” and have a signifi-
cant role in trade and industry.192  When securities manipulation oc-
curs, the damage to a corporation or other issuer of securities can be 
significant.193  The issuer may face a devaluation of stock, decline in 
credit rating, inability to merge with other business entities, and a 
myriad of other problems.194  If an issuer is injured by securities ma-
nipulation, it has a chilling effect on interstate commerce and nega-
tively effects industry.  Allowing an issuer standing to pursue injunc-
tive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or a 
sale is warranted because it is consistent with the policy justifications 
advanced for the existence of the 1934 Act. 
Issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security also helps miti-
gate the damage created by a fraud or deception.  When an issuer is 
injured by a manipulative or deceptive act, the holders of its securi-
ties are ultimately harmed.195  The initial injury to the issuer is a first 
 
 190 Id. at 1128–29 (holding that Avnet had failed to plead fraud with particularity 
as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)). 
 191 Id. at 1128. 
 192 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (providing the “necessity” for the regu-
lation contained within the 1934 Act). 
 193 Comment, supra note 11, at 629 (discussing the problems created by securities 
fraud). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. (“[D]amage actions are an outgrowth from [section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] 
to compensate those who have been injured when the damage was not prevented.”). 
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order harm that leads to the second order harm affecting holders of 
its securities.196  If an issuer is able to enjoin or prevent the harm to it-
self, then the damage to the holders of its securities is lessened or 
does not occur.197  Allowing an issuer standing to seek injunctive relief 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is justified because it stops the 
harm to the issuer and potentially prevents the need for numerous 
damages suits.198 
C. The Corporate Issuer as Best Champion of Shareholders’ Rights 
A corporate issuer should have standing to seek injunctive relief 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a 
security because the corporate form makes it uniquely capable to 
champion the rights of its shareholders.  The corporate issuer is the 
best champion of its shareholders because it allows for collective ac-
tion, possesses extensive resources, and prevents overburdening the 
SEC. 
Allowing a corporate issuer standing to seek injunctive relief un-
der section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of a sale is justified 
because the corporate form enables individuals to act collectively, 
rather than as fragmented segments.  In Cox & Hazen on Corporations, 
Professors James D. Cox and Thomas Lee Hazen state, “The corpo-
rate form . . . facilitates a good amount of efficiency: Those with 
managerial skills and experience are entrusted with the capital of 
their investors . . . to make an optimal use of their energies by devot-
ing themselves to their individual vocations.”199  In short, the corpo-
rate form enables individuals to act together with centralized man-
agement that has both experience and expertise.200 
Allowing a corporate issuer standing to seek injunctive relief un-
der section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or sale of a se-
curity enables all individuals who might potentially have been 
harmed by an alleged deception to sue as a unified group with most 
likely better legal counsel and more litigation experience.  Moreover, 
allowing an issuer standing to seek injunctive relief also may prevent 
 
 196 See id. 
 197 See id. 
 198 See also supra note 168 (discussing why allowing an issuer standing to seek in-
junctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a 
security provides relief to deserving individuals who would not have standing to sue 
under these provisions). 
 199 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 1.05 
(2d ed. 2003) (discussing the virtues of the corporate form). 
 200 See, e.g., id.; EISENBERG, supra note 22, at 100 (noting that centralized manage-
ment is one of the characteristics of the corporate form). 
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numerous damages actions that may result if harm is allowed to con-
tinue without an action for injunctive relief.201  One action for injunc-
tive relief by a corporate issuer that did not purchase or sell based on 
an alleged deception is preferable to scores of damages suits that may 
result if a deception is not abated.202 
Beyond the benefits of collective action, allowing an issuer stand-
ing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with-
out the purchase or sale of a security is also justified because a corpo-
rate issuer likely has better resources to ensure that an action is 
properly litigated.  An issuer’s management is almost certain to have 
better information about the value of corporate assets, earning po-
tential, future earnings, and a variety of other factors that determine 
the correct price of the issuer’s stock.203  Because of this, the issuer’s 
management is in a better position to detect and potentially remedy a 
deception relating to the corporation’s securities. 
A corporate issuer also has better resources to ensure that an ac-
tion for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is prop-
erly litigated because it likely has the capital necessary to bring a suit 
promptly before its shareholders are harmed.204  One of the virtues of 
the corporate form is that it allows capital to be aggregated so that 
individuals can come together to weather the perils of business.205  In 
almost every instance, the ability to aggregate capital allows the issuer 
to litigate claims under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 better than any 
individual shareholder. 
Furthermore, a corporate issuer is the best champion of its 
shareholders’ rights and should have standing under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or sale because allowing such 
standing will prevent overburdening the SEC with enforcement ac-
tions.  Section 21(e) of the 1934 Act expressly gives the SEC the 
power to enforce section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase 
or sale of a security.206  If a corporate issuer has standing to seek in-
 
 201 See supra Part III.B. 
 202 See supra Part III.B. 
 203 Comment, supra note 11, at 628–29 (discussing why a “corporation is in a 
markedly better position to protect its shareholders’ interests than are the share-
holders themselves”). 
 204 See id. 
 205 See, e.g., COX & HAZEN, supra note 199, § 1.05 (stating that the corporate form 
assembles and combines the amount of capital necessary to participate in modern 
business); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“Corporations are a necessary fea-
ture of modern business activity, and their aggregated capital has become the source 
of nearly all great enterprises”). 
 206 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
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junctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the pur-
chase or sale of a security, then the SEC has numerous allies in fulfill-
ing its obligations under the 1934 Act.207 
Allowing an issuer standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
without a purchase or a sale makes sense because the most concen-
trated benefit of correcting a deception or fraud goes to the issuer of 
the securities.  Although correcting a deception or fraud helps fulfill 
the underlying reasons for the 1933 Act and 1934 Act, the issuer and 
its shareholders gain the greatest benefit and should be charged with 
paying some of the expense for this benefit. 
IV. OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF ISSUER STANDING 
Even though strong policy justifications exist for a corporate is-
suer to have standing to seek injunctive relief without the purchase or 
sale of a security, significant obstacles stand in the way of the Su-
preme Court holding that such standing is available.  The Court does 
have substantial power in defining the contours of the private right of 
action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because it is judicially im-
plied.208  However, arguments against the existence of issuer standing 
without a purchase or sale can be founded upon the Supreme 
Court’s aversion to broadening standing under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, the possible misuse of issuer standing by directors and of-
ficers, and interpretation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the con-
text of the 1933 Act209 and the 1934 Act.210 
A. The Court’s Aversion to Broadening Standing Under  
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
The Supreme Court has never addressed whether an issuer has 
standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
 
 207 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (holding that an implied 
private right of action exists under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act because private en-
forcement is a “necessary supplement” to SEC action); Mut. Shares Corp. v. Genesco, 
Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546–47 (2d Cir. 1967) (recognizing standing for stockholders 
seeking injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or 
sale of a security in part because allowing standing helps the SEC to enforce the 1934 
Act); Granada Invs., Inc. v. DWG Corp., 717 F. Supp. 533, 536 (N.D. Ohio 1989) 
(holding that standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
without the purchase or sale of a security allows plaintiffs to “protect their rights and 
assist in the enforcement of the federal securities laws”). 
 208 See supra Part I (discussing the Supreme Court’s wide discretion in determining 
standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because it is a judicially implied private 
right of action). 
 209 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 210 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
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without the purchase or sale of a security, but a number of its opin-
ions, including Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,211 create signifi-
cant concerns about whether such standing exists.  Supreme Court 
case law shows that the Court is generally opposed to broadening 
standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and adverse to making 
exceptions to the purchaser-seller rule.  Moreover, the Court adopted 
the purchaser-seller rule from a case that applied the rule to an ac-
tion for injunctive relief. 
Although the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the ex-
istence of a private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5,212 the Court has been opposed to broadening that standing.213  
Since the mid 1970s, many implied private rights of action under the 
securities laws have been significantly narrowed.214  Because of the 
Supreme Court’s restrictive approach, lower courts have also become 
less willing to broaden any existing implied remedies.215 
In terms of the private right of action under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court has limited standing in damages ac-
tions to purchasers and sellers of securities,216 required a showing of 
 
 211 421 U.S. 723 (1975); see also Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 
462 (2d Cir. 1952) (providing the rule that became the basis for the Blue Chip deci-
sion). 
 212 See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (“Judicial interpre-
tation and application, legislative acquiescence, and the passage of time have re-
moved any doubt that a private cause of action exists for a violation of Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5, and constitutes an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act’s 
requirements.”); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (“The 
existence of this implied remedy [under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] is simply be-
yond peradventure.”); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (hold-
ing that the implied private cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is 
“well established”). 
 213 Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that if Blue Chip was de-
cided today, the Supreme Court would hold that no private right of action exists un-
der section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  See ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, 
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW § 13.02[A] (1999) (“A fair guess is that if the issue 
were to arise for the first time today, the Supreme Court would hold that no private 
right of action exists, leaving enforcement of the rule to the SEC alone.”). 
 214 See HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.2[1] (discussing the general trend of limiting im-
plied remedies under the securities laws). 
 215 See id. § 12.2[2] (“There can be no doubt . . . that the restrictive trend in the 
Supreme Court has cut back on the lower courts’ willingness to create additional 
remedies.  The overwhelming majority of recent cases has denied the existence of 
any other than the well-established implied remedies.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 216 Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 731–32 (holding that standing in damages actions under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is limited to purchasers or sellers of securities). 
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scienter,217 held that the conduct complained of must be “manipulat-
ive or deceptive,”218 and ruled that a private right of action does not 
exist against aiders and abettors.219  The Supreme Court did hold that 
an implied private right of action exists under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 even though other express remedies are available.220  However, 
the Court has substantially limited the scope of the implied right of 
action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
The Court has great discretion in determining the contours of 
the private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,221 and 
substantial policy justifications exist for allowing issuer standing to 
seek injunctive relief without a purchase or a sale.222  Nevertheless, the 
existence of issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or a sale is questionable be-
cause of the Supreme Court’s general opposition to broadening im-
plied remedies under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
Blue Chip demonstrates that the Supreme Court may be adverse 
to making exceptions to the purchaser-seller rule.  In Blue Chip, the 
Supreme Court both adopted the purchaser-seller rule and refused to 
make an exception to that rule for aborted transaction cases in which 
the manipulative or deceptive act prevented the consummation of a 
purchase or a sale.223  As previously discussed, the aborted transaction 
exception, the injunctive relief exception, and other various excep-
tions developed during the interim between the announcement of 
the purchaser-seller rule in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.224 and the 
 
 217 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194–214 (1976) (holding that a pri-
vate cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires a showing of sci-
enter on the part of the defendant). 
 218 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977) (holding that sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 only apply to conduct that is either manipulative or decep-
tive). 
 219 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 
191–92 (1994) (holding that a private right of action does not exist against those who 
aid and abet a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 220 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380–87 (1983) (holding that 
an implied cause of action exists under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 even though 
express remedies exist covering the same transaction). 
 221 See supra Part I (discussing the Supreme Court’s wide discretion in determining 
standing under section 10(b) and rule 10b–5 because it is a judicially implied private 
right of action). 
 222 See supra Part III. 
 223 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754–55 (1975) (re-
jecting the aborted transaction exception); supra Part II.C (analyzing the develop-
ment and rejection of the aborted transaction exception). 
 224 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). 
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adoption of the rule in Blue Chip.225  The Supreme Court’s rejection of 
the aborted transaction exception in Blue Chip suggests that the Court 
may ultimately reject all of the exceptions that developed to the pur-
chaser-seller rule. 
If Blue Chip implicitly rejected all exceptions to the purchase-
seller rule, a corporate issuer will not have standing to seek injunctive 
relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or 
sale of a security.  Of course, Blue Chip can also be read narrowly as 
applying the purchaser-seller rule only to actions for damages, which 
is why the question of issuer standing to seek injunctive relief remains 
open. 
The fact that the Supreme Court adopted the purchaser-seller 
rule from a case that applied the rule to an action for injunctive relief 
also casts doubt on the existence of issuer standing to seek injunctive 
relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or 
sale of a security.  In Blue Chip, the Supreme Court adopted the pur-
chaser-seller rule that was announced in Birnbaum.226  The Court went 
so far as to state: “[W]e are of the opinion that Birnbaum was rightly 
decided.”227  Although not emphasized in the Second Circuit’s opin-
ion, Birnbaum was an action in equity under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.228 
In fact, the plaintiffs in Birnbaum explicitly sought and were de-
nied standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security.229  As previously dis-
cussed, in Birnbaum, a group of shareholders of Newport Steel Cor-
poration (“Newport”) alleged that the president and various mem-
bers of the board of directors of Newport defrauded the shareholders 
by permitting the president to sell his forty percent of stock in New-
port to Wilport Company (“Wilport”) for a large profit after rejecting 
a tender offer that would have been profitable to all of the share-
holders.230  Employing section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the shareholders 
 
 225 See supra Part II.C (discussing various exceptions to the purchaser-seller rule 
that were created between Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 98 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 
1951), and Blue Chip). 
 226 Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 731 (adopting the rule announced in Birnbaum). 
 227 Id. 
 228 See Birnbaum, 98 F. Supp. at 508; see also Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 420 
n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Though not apparent from the Second Circuit’s opinion, 
Birnbaum was a suit in equity seeking rescission of a sale allegedly violative of Rule 
10b-5 and an accounting by the defendants.”); Liberty Nat’l Ins. Holding Co. v. Char-
ter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 557 n.26 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Birnbaum . . . was a suit in equity, 
though this is not apparent from the court of appeals’ opinion.”). 
 229 98 F. Supp. at 508. 
 230 Id. 
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requested rescission of the sale of the stock, injunction of certain in-
dividuals from causing any future sale of the stock to Wilport, and an 
accounting by various defendants.231  The United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York dismissed the case because the 
shareholders had not purchased or sold securities in connection with 
the alleged deception,232 and the Second Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s opinion.233 
When the Supreme Court adopted the purchaser-seller rule that 
was announced in Birnbaum, the Court may have implicitly answered 
whether an issuer or anyone else may have standing to seek injunctive 
relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or 
sale of a security.  The Supreme Court may have already foreclosed 
the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller rule because 
Birnbaum was a case directly applying the purchaser-seller rule to a 
plea for injunctive relief. 
Blue Chip, however, did not explicitly address whether injunctive 
relief is available under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the 
purchase or sale of the security, so issuer standing may still be avail-
able.  Notably, the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller 
rule is well established in the Second Circuit, which is the court that 
decided Birnbaum.234  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s endorse-
ment of the holding in Birnbaum, its aversion to making exceptions to 
the purchaser-seller rule, and its general opposition to expanding 
implied rights of action create significant concerns about whether an 
issuer will be able to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security. 
B. Possible Misuse of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by  
Corporate Directors 
Concerns about possible misuse of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
may also dissuade the Supreme Court from holding that issuers have 
standing to seek injunctive relief without the purchase or sale of a se-
curity.  As mentioned previously, the Court’s holding in Blue Chip was 
largely based on policy concerns because “neither the congressional 
enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive guid-
ance.”235  Although the Court’s policy considerations for adopting the 
purchaser-seller rule in actions for monetary damage do not apply in 
 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. at 508–09. 
 233 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952). 
 234 See supra note 138. 
 235 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
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actions for injunctive relief,236 the Court may find possible misuse by 
corporate directors a compelling reason to hold that an issuer does 
not have standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security. 
In Liberty National Insurance Holding Co. v. Charter Co.,237 for ex-
ample, concerns about improper entrenchment by corporate man-
agement prompted the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit to hold that an issuer does not have standing to seek 
injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the pur-
chase or sale of a security.  In that case, Liberty National Insurance 
Holding Company (“Liberty National”) alleged that Charter Com-
pany and some of its subsidiaries (collectively “Charter”) had violated 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when Charter filed the required sched-
ule 13D reporting statement after it began acquiring Liberty National 
stock.238  Based on alleged misrepresentations in the 13D statement, 
Liberty National sought injunctive relief requiring Charter to divest 
itself of Liberty National stock.239  The United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Alabama dismissed the claim because Liberty 
National had not purchased or sold based on the alleged decep-
tion.240 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court and 
held that an issuer cannot seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security as a means 
to fend off a corporate control contest.241  The Court wrote, “[a] little 
knowledge of the delicate nature of the market for corporate control 
convinces us that there is no sound reason to provide an additional 
shield . . . with which entrenched management can fend off hostile 
takeover attempts.”242  Other courts have reached similar conclusions 
when corporate issuers have attempted to use section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 to defend against corporate control contests without the pur-
chase or sale of a security.243 
 
 236 See supra Part III.A (explaining that the policy considerations for adopting the 
purchaser-seller rule in Blue Chip do not apply to actions for injunctive relief because 
the same concerns about unjust enrichment do not apply to actions for injunctive re-
lief). 
 237 734 F.2d 545 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 238 Id. at 547–48. 
 239 Id. at 548. 
 240 Id. at 553. 
 241 Id. at 558–59. 
 242 Id. at 559. 
 243 See, e.g., John Labatt Ltd. v. Onex Corp., 890 F. Supp. 235, 247–48 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (holding that an issuer that is the target of a tender offer may not seek injunc-
tive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a secu-
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Arguably, Liberty National only limits the exception to the pur-
chaser-seller rule that allows an entity to seek injunctive relief under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a secu-
rity.  The Supreme Court could hold that an injunctive relief excep-
tion exists to the purchaser-seller rule except in cases in which the 
purpose is management entrenchment. 
This interpretation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is highly tor-
tured.  Although section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have grown far beyond 
the statutory enactment and administrative rule,244 and the Supreme 
Court has broad discretion in determining the contours of a judicially 
implied cause of action,245 creating exceptions to exceptions may be 
beyond what the Court is willing to allow. 
 
rity); Equity Oil Co. v. Consol. Oil & Gas, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 507, 514 (D. Utah 1983) 
(holding that an issuer does not have standing in corporate control contests to seek 
injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or sale be-
cause “entrenched management can use a suit for an injunction with voluminous 
discovery requests, for its delay value to defeat any takeover attempt, regardless of the 
merits of the case” (footnote omitted)); Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Hi-Shear In-
dus., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (“[I]t would be senseless to allow 
target management to wield [Rule 10b-5] as a weapon in takeover bids when Con-
gress has enacted Sections 13(d), 14(d), and 14(e) specifically to ensure fairness in 
battles for corporate control.”); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 490 F. Supp. 660, 666 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding that an issuer did not have standing to seek injunctive relief 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security in part 
because of the management’s interest in retaining control of the corporation); Mo-
sinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 354 F. Supp. 686, 697–98 (W.D. Wis. 1973) (holding 
that an issuer does not have standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security when management is in-
volved in a fight to control the corporation).  But see USG Corp. v. Cottle, 689 F. 
Supp. 1483, 1493–94 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that an issuer had standing to enjoin 
the pursuit of a tender offer using section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the pur-
chase or sale of a security); Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Edelman, No. 87-4346 (GEB), 
1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16783, at *8–12 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 1987) (recognizing that an is-
suer had standing to seek injunctive relief in the context of a tender offer under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security); Hanna Mining 
Co. v. Norcen Energy Res. Ltd., 574 F. Supp. 1172, 1198 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (holding 
that the target of a corporate takeover had standing to seek injunctive relief under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security); Moore v. 
Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490, 492 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (granting an issuer 
standing in the context of a tender offer to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security to help “eliminate any un-
desirable practices” in the securities marketplace). 
 244 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (“When 
we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has 
grown from little more than a legislative acorn.”). 
 245 See id. at 748–49 (discussing the purchaser-seller rule and the possible exis-
tence of an injunctive relief exception). 
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C. Statutory Interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
In Cowin v. Bresler,246 Judge Bork, writing for the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, stated: 
 It is true, as the Court in Blue Chip acknowledged, that the ques-
tion of what constitutes the proper plaintiff class under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cannot be conclusively determined by resort 
to the text of those enactments; as one might expect, neither the 
statute nor the rule speaks directly to the question of who may sue 
since the right to sue was created afterwards by the judiciary.  Still, 
in the process of implying private rights judges must take account 
of the statutory scheme.  No better guidance exists than the lan-
guage of the relevant statute and regulation.247 
Although section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not provide conclusive 
guidance regarding issuer standing to seek injunctive relief without 
the purchase or sale of a security, the Court may refuse to find the ex-
istence of such standing because of judicial restraint, the limitations 
placed on other express remedies in the 1934 Act, and the wording of 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
The Court may exercise judicial restraint and deny issuers stand-
ing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with-
out the purchase or sale of a security because the existence of such 
standing would require an extremely tortured interpretation of sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  As the Court noted in Blue Chip, “the 
wording of § 10(b), making fraud in connection with the purchase or sale 
of a security a violation of the Act, is surely badly strained when con-
strued to provide a cause of action, not to purchasers and sellers of 
securities, but to the world at large.”248  In Cowin v. Bresler, for exam-
ple, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit denied standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to indi-
viduals seeking injunctive relief without the purchase or sale of a se-
curity in part because fashioning such a remedy in light of the pur-
chaser-seller rule for monetary damages would require a grossly 
strained reading of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.249 
Even if the Court holds that an exception to the purchaser-seller 
rule exists for issuers seeking injunctive relief under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5, the Court is still left with the problem of manage-
 
 246 741 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 247 Id. at 424 (citations omitted). 
 248 Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 733 n.5. 
 249 Cowin, 741 F.2d at 424 (“Attempting to fashion a different concept of standing 
for cases [that concern injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] would 
involve us in distinctions altogether too awkward to be persuasive.”). 
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ment using this exception for purposes of entrenchment.250  Ulti-
mately, the Court would likely have to adopt an exception to the ex-
ception, which would require an even more strained reading of sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.251  The Court may not be willing to stretch 
so far beyond the words of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
The limitations in other express remedies in the 1934 Act also 
suggest that the Court may be reluctant to grant an issuer standing 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act 
provides a private right of action for “any person who shall purchase 
or sell any security at a price” that was affected by a variety of manipu-
lative acts described in sections 9(a), (b), and (c) of the 1934 Act.252  
Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act provides a private right of action to 
“any person . . . who . . . shall have purchased or sold a security” 
based on “false or misleading” statements made in filings to the 
SEC.253 
In both section 9(e) and section 18(a), standing is limited to 
those individuals who have purchased or sold based on the allegedly 
deceptive acts.254  Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 also afford relief to 
individuals who have been victims of deceptive acts.  The Court may 
hold that an issuer or individual seeking injunctive relief under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must also be a purchaser or a seller to be 
consistent with other provisions of the 1934 Act.255 
The Supreme Court examined this argument in Blue Chip, but 
failed to find it conclusive as to whether the purchaser-seller rule ap-
plied to actions for monetary damages.256  The Court did state, how-
 
 250 See supra Part IV.B (discussing possible misuse of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
by corporate directors for purposes of management entrenchment). 
 251 See supra Part IV.B. 
 252 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (2000) (discussing persons liable in suits at law or in equity 
for manipulation of security prices). 
 253 Id. § 78r(a) (discussing liability for misleading statements made in SEC filings). 
 254 The express rights of action in the 1933 Act are also limited to individuals or 
entities purchasing or acquiring securities based on deceptive acts.  See supra Part 
II.A. 
 255 Notably, section 16(b) of the 1934 Act does provide a private right of action for 
recovery of short-swing, insider profits “by the issuer, or by the owner of any security 
of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to 
bring such suit . . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000).  However, this provision differs sig-
nificantly from sections 9(e), 10(b), and 18(a) because section 16(b) is a strict liabil-
ity cause of action, whereas sections 9(e), 10(b), and 18(a) require a manipulative or 
deceptive act.  Thus, a court is more likely to interpret the implied private right of 
action under section 10(b) in a similar manner to sections 9(e) and 18(a). 
 256 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (“[N]either 
the congressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive 
guidance.”). 
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ever, “[i]t would indeed be anomalous to impute to Congress an in-
tention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially implied cause of 
action beyond the bounds it delineated for comparable express 
causes of action.”257  When coupled with the Court’s adoption in Blue 
Chip of the purchaser-seller rule for actions seeking monetary relief, 
the limitations in other express remedies in the 1934 Act may be 
enough for the Court to hold that the purchaser-seller rule also ap-
plies to actions for injunctive relief.258 
Finally, the wording of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 suggests 
that the Court may be reluctant to hold that an issuer has standing to 
seek injunctive relief without the purchase or sale of a security.  As 
stated previously, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act makes it unlawful for 
any person to “use or employ, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or 
any security not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive de-
vice or contrivance . . . .”259  To enforce section 10(b), the SEC prom-
ulgated Rule 10b-5.260  Rule 10b-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of 
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a)  To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b)  To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c)  To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.261 
The words “in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity” suggest that there must be some actual link between the pur-
chase or sale of a security and the alleged fraudulent conduct.  The 
Supreme Court may reject a more expansive construction of the “in 
connection with” requirement and refuse to allow an issuer standing 
to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without 
the purchase or sale of a security.  In fact, based on these grounds, 
 
 257 Id. at 736. 
 258 But see supra note 255 (discussing section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, which provides 
a private right of action for issuers to recover short-swing, insider profits). 
 259 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000). 
 260 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005). 
 261 Id. 
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the Court may refuse to allow any individual standing to seek injunc-
tive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase 
or sale of a security.262 
Notably, after the purchaser-seller rule was announced in Birn-
baum v. Newport Steel Corp. and before it was adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Blue Chip, Congress refused on two different occasions to 
amend the jurisdictional reach of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.263  
The lack of congressional action lends credibility to the argument 
that Congress endorses the purchaser-seller requirement and does 
not want an expansive class of plaintiffs with section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 claims. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although compelling policy justifications exist for allowing an is-
suer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security, substantial obstacles 
stand in the way of the Supreme Court holding that such standing ex-
ists.  An exception to the purchaser-seller requirement is justified for 
a corporate issuer seeking injunctive relief because of the nature of 
injunctive relief, the injury to the issuer, and the role of the issuer as 
best champion of its shareholders.  However, the Court will likely 
deny the existence of such standing because of the Supreme Court’s 
aversion to broadening standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 
the possible misuse of issuer standing by directors and officers, and 
interpretation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the context of the 
1933 Act and the 1934 Act. 
The best solution may be for Congress to amend section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 to allow an issuer standing to seek injunctive relief 
without the purchase or sale of a security.  Based on previous at-
tempts to amend the jurisdictional reach of section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5,264 however, Congress may be reluctant to alter either of these 
provisions.  Thus, how the judicial oak will grow remains uncertain. 
 
 262 See Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that no in-
junctive relief exception exists to the purchaser-seller rule, in part based on the statu-
tory structure of the 1934 Act). 
 263 Id. (“Congress was asked on two different occasions to expand the jurisdic-
tional reach of [section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] but chose not to.”); Blue Chip Stamps 
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 732 (1975) (“In 1957 and again in 1959, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission sought from Congress amendment of §10(b) to 
change its wording from ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security’ to 
‘in connection with the purchase or sale of, or any attempt to purchase or sell, any 
security.’ . . . Neither change was adopted by Congress.”). 
 264 See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
